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Deference in Disarray: Conflict and
Vacillation in the Burger Court
Stanley H. Friedelbaum*
I.

Toward A New Judicial Activism

During the past half century, the principle of judicial deference
to legislative decision-making has generally prevailed whenever economic and social regulatory schemes have been challenged on constitutional grounds. Among the effects of the 1937-38 struggle over the
composition of the Supreme Court and, more pointedly, over the nature of judicial review itself, has been the notion that the involvement of courts in the formulation of public policy, both national and
state, ought to be minimized, if not altogether precluded. At its
zenith, deference produced levels of restraint so sweeping that it bordered upon judicial abdication; indeed, from time to time, a recurring pattern of nonintervention promoted charges of evasion and irresponsibility. The Court's image of postured inaction, sustained by
an extravagant and recurring rhetoric, ranged well beyond respect
for time-honored presumptions of validity.
To be sure, the vagaries of due process and equal protection
offered neither dependable nor readily defensible standards on which
judicial activism might be based. Yet the abrupt shift from the cavalier negativism of the past cannot be explained simply by reference
to uncertain criteria or, for that matter, to the customary catalogue
of causes such as changes in the Court's membership, a lack of expertise or alterations in judicial philosophy. The enigma of the early
years remains.' Meaningful review, accompanied by an intermittent
and limited revival of substantive due process, did not reappear until
* A.B., Brooklyn College, 1947; A.M., Rutgers University, 1948; Ph.D., Columbia University, 1955. Dr. Friedelbaum is a professor and vice chairperson of political science at
Rutgers University. His extensive publication listing includes the following: CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASE STUDIES IN THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (972); Independent State
Grounds: Contemporary Invitations to Judicial Activism, in STATE SUPREME COURTS:
POLICYMAKERS IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM (M. Porter & G. Tarr, eds. 1982); Reprise or Denouement: Deference and the New Dissonance in the Burger Court, 26 EMORY L.J. 337
1977).
I. An imaginative but inconclusive effort to delve into the "mysteries" of the Court's
remarkable turnabout appears in McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court:
An Exhumation and Reburial. 1962 SUP. CT. REV. 34 (1962).
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the late 1960s. More explicit admissions of the propriety and the
necessity of some return to a judicial critique, even in the proscribed
economic and social areas, did not emerge until the advent of the
Burger era.$ All the same, judicial concessions have been meager,
the occasions for such indulgences have been sporadic, and the opinions have been replete with a repetitive apologia offering assurances
of the vitality of the principle, if not always the realization, of deferential review.
Lest it be assumed that the intervening three decades represented the Court in eclipse, the record reveals subtle, albeit covert,
clues to intervention. While unabashed allusions to a judicial role of
renewed activism have been sparse, alternative routes, less familiar
in the appraisal of economic and social schemes, have been periodically pursued. Restrictive views of the commerce power, a limited
revival and application of the contract clause and a narrowly focused
view of federal preemption standards, for example, led to occasional
judicial negatives despite lavish and oft-repeated avowals of deference.4 More recently, a resort to substantive due process has been
openly conceded, though such a step seems still to be taken almost as
an act of desperation when all other avenues of decision-making have
been found wanting.8
As the Court's aversion to systematic review continues to diminish, so equal protection increasingly has come to be the predicate
relied upon in the assessment of economic and social legislation. The
guidelines are unsettled and inadequate for principled adjudication. 6
The first decades of the twentieth century found the equal protection
clause treated as little more than an ancillary to due process. Perhaps Justice Holmes was given to hyperbole when he characterized
17
equal protection as the "last resort of constitutional arguments."
Nevertheless, the clause rarely found favor as a substitute for due
process. A single holding of unconstitutionality on equal protection
2. See, e.g., Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (identification of
a procedural-substantive dichotomy in a wage garnishment case); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (expansive reading of a right to travel); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969) (articulation of a fledgling right of privacy).
3. Perhaps the Court's most controversial venture related to assertion of an affirmative
constitutional right to an abortion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973).
4. See Friedelbaum, Reprise or Denouement: Deference and the New Dissonance in
the Burger Court, 26 EMORY LI. 337 (1977).
5. The dangers implicit in reembracing substantive due process were candidly explored in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
6. An exhaustive review of the equal protection clause in evolution may be found in
Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
7. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
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grounds, reached somewhat reluctantly in a 1957 case, arose from an
isolated state scheme founded in exceptional conditions. 8 Though the
Court ultimately moved to overrule this "derelict" decision, 9 too
many divergent interpretations of the clause have occurred to permit
any easy revival of extravagantly permissive review.
Suspect classifications, initiated in the midst of the Second
World War, grew slowly and guardedly during succeeding decades.' 0
Concomitantly, a theory of fundamental rights began to develop."
Like suspect classifications, it required rigorous scrutiny and a reverse presumption of validity which virtually assured a negative result. By contrast, the simple rationality test almost ineluctably led to
a finding of constitutionality in the regulatory sphere. Criticisms of
the two-tier approach - centering on its lack of versatility and its
mechanistic applications - eventually suggested an intermediate
standard of scrutiny currently associated with gender-related cases. 12
While the proposed Equal Rights Amendment was pending before
the states, it seemed inappropriate and perhaps unnecessary to extend the list of suspect classifications that, in practice, markedly narrowed the range of policy options open to the Court.
Despite misgivings concerning what has emerged as a tripartite
classification of scrutiny levels, the most provocative aspect of equal
protection analysis remains the rationality test. Minimal review, routinely applied to economic and social programs, offered few surprises
as the Court repeatedly rejected its former role as a "superlegislature." Yet it has been precisely in terms of rationality that much of
the ferment has occurred and that the divisions on the Court may
well become most pronounced.
II.

Equal Protection in Transition: Old Guidelines Reexamined

A flurry of cases, decided during the past several terms of the
Supreme Court, raises intriguing questions concerning the breadth of
the rational basis test. No longer is the Court limited to an examination of acts characterized as wholly irrelevant to the legislative pur8. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
9. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
10. The first reference to a "suspect" category appeared in the Japanese evacuation
case, Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
II. The habitual criminal sterilization case, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942), is generally described as the first decision establishing fundamental
rights or interests.
12. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) ("[Classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives").
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pose. If standards continue to be unpredictable and subject to modification as individual cases arise, at least a measure of reliability and
constancy attaches to the basic principle of intervention. The outcome cannot be predicted with certainty, and new tests have been
devised and applied, albeit on a varying scale, to a far broader range
of cases than had heretofore been considered possible.
Even as the Court reiterated its "proper" regard for legislative
judgments in the early 1970s, a majority revealed a subtle shift in
the direction of the less indulgent guidelines more recently enunciated. Justice Powell, writing for seven members of the Court in Mcginnis v. Royster,'3 sustained the validity of a complex state sentencing system. The scheme distinguished between the lack of "goodtime credit" toward parole eligibility for those subjected to
presentence county jail imprisonment and the award of such credit
to those who had been released on bail prior to sentencing and who
subsequently were committed to state prisons. The latter, the state
alleged, performed under a rehabilitation program (unlike that fostered in the county detention centers) and so merited good-time
credit for the entire period of their confinement.
In response to challenges filed by county prisoners on equal protection grounds, a three-judge federal district court upheld their
claims because of the absence of a rational basis for the statutory
distinction. 14 The Supreme Court reversed, predicating its decision
essentially on a slightly skewed application of the same test. Yet Justice Powell placed a curious emphasis on legislative purpose while
ostensibly repudiating any "speculative probing" into the intent of a
coordinate branch.' 5 At the opposite end of the spectrum, Justice
Douglas, joined by Justice Marshall, would have affirmed on the ba6
sis of what he described as an invidious discrimination.'
In the years that followed, the Court declined to expand the list
of subjects liable to strict scrutiny or to add to the fundamental
rights previously articulated. Instead, a more rigorous application of
existing standards became evident, almost by indirection. The cases
did not involve economic and social regulation within the accepted
meaning of the phrase. For the most part, they touched upon areas
that were accorded varying degrees of heightened scrutiny when, in
fact, no more than minimal review was conceded.' By the middle of
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

410 U.S. 263 (1973).
See Royster v. McGinnis, 332 F. Supp. 973 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
McGinnis v. Royster, 410 U.S. 263, 276-77.
Id. at 281, 283.
See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976); Wein-
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the decade, a majority announced parenthetically that a rational basis standard need not be a "toothless" one."8 Yet equal protection
analysis remained nominally within the bounds delineated earlier
even if, as a growing number of cases revealed, the challenged classifications were notably more diversified.
The origins of the debate currently in progress are traceable to
a 1980 case, United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz.9 At
issue were provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1974
designed to restrict and to condition employee eligibility for "windfall" benefits. Changeover and cutoff dates were established to reduce the number of persons qualified to receive dual payments from
the railroad and social security systems. In what was perhaps its
most controversial section, the law drew distinctions between employees who had more than ten but less than twenty-five years of
service tied to the existence or want of a "current connection" to the
railroad industry as of the changeover or retirement date. It was this
feature that came under searching examination when it was challenged on fifth amendment due process and equal protection grounds
before a federal district court. In an action for declaratory relief, a
group of employees charged that the differentiation between classes
of annuitants was not "rationally related" to the avowed congressional purpose, that is, to insure the solvency of the system and to
preserve vested benefits. The district court agreed and found the section in question unconstitutional. 20 A direct appeal was taken to the
Supreme Court.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court fell within the traditional pattern of deferential review. While admitting the absence of
a uniform or consistent test under the equal protection clause, he
had little hesitation in establishing the rational basis standard as the
touchstone of decision. There followed conventional notations that
classifications need not conform to models of mathematical precision
and that ill-advised or unartfully prepared legislation, without more,
did not offend constitutional prescriptions.2 ' Justice Rehnquist
avoided any inquiries into group pressures and their effects in the
legislative forum. Since the classification was neither arbitrary nor
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411

U.S. I (1973).
18. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
19. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
20. Id. at 174. The opinion of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana is unreported.
21. Fritz, 449 U.S. at 175.
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irrational, any investigation of the drawing of lines ended when
"plausible reasons for Congress' action" had been provided.2
Justice Stevens, concurring in the judgment, adopted an intermediate approach to the review of economic and social schemes. He
did not insist upon identifying the "actual purpose" of the legislature
because to do so would place an undue emphasis on motivation or
acknowledged goals, both of which might be unknown. The appropriate test to be applied, as Stevens explained it, was the discovery of a
"correlation between the classification and either the actual purpose
of the statute or a legitimate purpose" that might reasonably be presumed to have prompted an "impartial" legislature to act.2 3 In this
case, he found that the actual purpose was clear; the elimination of
dual benefits was a legitimate objective and the distinctions drawn
represented an "impartial" method for carrying into effect the intent
24
of the statute.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in Fritz.
It was this opinion, to a far greater extent that the Court's expression of views, that suggested a major reappraisal of long-held standards of deference. Despite perfunctory disclaimers, the rational basis test was no longer to serve as a mechanical mode of review - one
that virtually assured a pro forma endorsement of what had been
enacted. It was meaningless cant for Justice Brennan to disavow
"second-guessing" the wisdom of legislative classifications when, in
fact, he sought a searching examination of the means and ends of
Congress. The operable criteria, as these began to emerge, required
courts "first to deduce the independent objectives of the statute, usually from statements of purpose and other evidence in the statute
and legislative history, and second to analyze whether the challenged
classification rationally furthers achievement of those objectives."'
Such guidelines clearly went beyond the ostensible effort to view
with skepticism the claims of Government attorneys.
Though Justice Brennan announced that the mode of analysis
being advanced had been established by "governing precedents, ' '26
the cases cited bore little, if any, relation to those generally associated with the regulatory area. The guidelines followed in educational
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id. at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at
Id.at

179.
181.
182.
187.
183.
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entitlement,2" gender-related, 28 and age discrimination2 controversies are not analogous to those applied in an examination of economic and social legislation. Furthermore, it is impossible to dismiss
statements that seem to invite renewed judicial delving into the special interests responsible for specific acts and the possibility that
Congress might have been misled. Such a probe into the legislative
record touches upon delicate questions of motivation that are reminiscent of the interventionism of the pre-1937 era even though, as
seems apparent, a full-scale resurgence of activism still is remote and
the results thus far have been far less invidious and pervasive.
What prompted Justice Brennan to embark upon a reevaluation
of the doctrine of deference looking toward a major restatement of
the judicial role? Had the abandonment of self-abnegation, so long a
part of the Court's unchallenged legacy, actually been in process
since the early 1970s when a limited version of substantive due process had been reintroduced to protect a varied assortment of "libertarian" interests? Was meaningful review of economic and social
schemes no more than a logical and perhaps an unavoidable consequence of the heightened scrutiny that has increasingly found favor
among the Justices? Did the adoption of new and more searching
criteria, admittedly limited to a minority, reflect a dramatic breakthrough and the resolve of others currently on the Court? That Justice Brennan's articulation of principles went beyond his dissatisfaction with the railroad retirement act amendments need not be
belabored. What remains conjectural is the extent of the Court's
willingness to establish a new activism and, more pointedly, whether
a majority can be relied upon to convert these convictions into controlling constitutional doctrine.
If legislative restrictions upon retirement benefits had evoked
strongly held views concerning the nature and extent of deference,
an even sharper exchange occurred when challenges were leveled
against a congressionally authorized supplemental security income
program that differentiated allowances on the basis of the status of
the recipients. The program, in the form of amendments to the Social Security Act, had restricted funds for the indigent blind, aged
and disabled to a small monthly grant of "comfort money" while
they were being treated or were in custodial care as patients in pub27.
28.
U.S. 636
29.

See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I (1973).
See Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420
(1975).
See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
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lic institutions. This reduced stipend was denied entirely to otherwise
eligible persons confined in facilities not receiving Medicaid funds.
Since large numbers of those excluded, ranging in age from twentyone to sixty-four, consisted of the mentally ill, members of this group
filed a class action in a federal district court charging that the legislative classification violated the equal protection component of the
fifth amendment's due process clause."0
The court elected to treat the case as one premised upon a
"mental health" classification and, therefore, akin to but not precisely equivalent to such suspect designations as race and national
origin. Since the mentally ill constituted a "politically impotent, insular minority,"31 the opinion noted, their treatment warranted an
intermediate level of judicial scrutiny. It followed that the classification had to bear a "substantial relation" to the object of the Act,
assessed in light of its "primary purpose."3 2 The court found no articulated legislative intent to exclude the mentally ill inmate from
the benefits, nor any "possible unexpressed purpose" 33 for the denial
of comfort money. In addition, the Government's arguments for exclusion, largely relating to the conservation and use of scarce resources, paled when measured against the rights of inmates similarly
situated."" Thus, the eligibility requirements could not survive judicial examination.
The Supreme Court, in Schweiker v. Wilson, 5 rejected the district court's characterization of the Act's differential standards and
its assumption that the statute set apart the mentally ill for disparate
treatment. Justice Blackmun, who wrote for a five-justice majority,
sustained the classification as one advancing "legitimate legislative
goals in a rational fashion." ' By way of a chary reaffirmation of the
doctrine of deference, the Court pointed to the traditional restraints
that judges are obliged to observe in a democratic state. Justice
Blackmun cautioned that choices, looking toward the solution of economic and social problems, lay primarily with representative bodies
unless fundamental rights are threatened or the distinctions drawn
are inherently invidious.37 Yet, for all of this vapid litany, the
Court's rehearsal of familiar principles seemed somewhat strained.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Sterling v. Harris, 478 F. Supp, 1046 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
Id. at 1052.
Id. at 1052-53.
Id. at 1053.
Id. at 1053-54.
450 U.S. 221 (1981).
Id. at 234.
Id. at 230.

THE BURGER COURT

The defense of a denial of the "reduced stipend" or "limited gratuity" had a hollow ring, and the call for a "strong presumption of
constitutionality" no longer carried with it the intensity that it had
previously conveyed.
If, in Justice Blackmun's opinion, there was implicit recognition
of a need to appraise a concededly "sparse"3 8 legislative record and a
finding that Congress' exclusionary action was "deliberate" and "intentional," 3 9 Justice Powell's dissent imparted a new vitality and, in
part, even an urgency to an examination of legislative purpose. Routine allusions to the archetypical bases of deference were followed by
a marked skepticism in the fashioning of points of reference tied to
the assessment of retrospective reasons for legislative policy choices.
Equal protection, as Justice Powell perceived it, required a determination of "actual" purpose supported by legislative history.' 0 This
"marginally more demanding scrutiny," in turn, tested the "plausibility of the tendered purpose," thus preserving something more exacting than a perfunctory rational basis analysis."1 Applying these
new standards, Justice Powell had little difficulty in finding the elimination of a comfort allowance less than convincing and carrying significant risks that "irrational" distinctions were being made. He attributed the disparities in treatment to legislative oversight and
thoughtlessness, leading to results that served no discernible
42
interest.'
Not only had the dissent become more forceful since Justice
Brennan's initial foray, just a few months earlier, in Fritz, but Justice Powell's new posture also added to the ranks of those who had
departed from the traditional test, bringing their number to one
short of a majority. 43 The old deferential review, suggesting little
more than a presumed statement of facts to sustain legislative
choices, was considerably less secure. No longer could the government blithely rely upon a permissive equal protection test that assumed little or no role, other than a legitimating one, for the judiciary. An indulgent approach to economic and social schemes was not
axiomatic. In fact, even the majority's professed convictions had
been shaken for all of the outward fittings and dauntless rhetoric.
The outlook was uncertain and, if past experiences with doctrinal
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id..at 235.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 244.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 239, 247.
Justice Powell was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens.
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patterns served true, a periodic redefinition seemed to be in the offing. The facile and readily met tests of the previous decades could
not be taken for granted in a Court that had visibly outlived the easy
deference of the post-1937 era.
The scope of judicial intervention in economic and social cases
returned to traditional, less intrusive levels as the Court proceeded to
weigh the merits of a major federal regulatory program under the
commerce clause. At issue in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Association"' was a surface mining control act intended to protect environmental interests, to conserve natural resources and to guard against the despoilment of the land and the
degradation of the quality of life generally. In a sweeping attack on
the constitutionality of the statute, coal producers and others sought
declaratory and injunctive relief by way of a pre-enforcement challenge. A federal district court found provisions of the act to be violative of the tenth amendment, of the just compensation clause of the
fifth amendment and of procedural due process requirements.4 The
Government sought review before the Supreme Court on direct
appeal.
Justice Marshall's opinion, which sustained the law, rejected
these alleged defects. The principal thrust of the Court's review centered about the charge that the act served to displace the freedom of
state action in structuring "integral operations" pertaining to a
traditional state function. From the outset, then, the outcome depended upon the construction of the Court's precedent-setting 1976
decision in National League of Cities v. Usery,"4 in which, for the
first time in four decades, an act of Congress predicated affirmatively
upon the commerce clause had failed to survive. It was the impact of
the tenth amendment, rather than the breadth of the commerce
clause per se, that served as the critical pivot. Since Justice Marshall
found that the challenged law did not regulate the state as a state,
any negative effects emanating from National League of Cities
failed to materialize. The Court applied no more than a minimal
rational basis test in deferring broadly to the legislative will. 47 Missing was any impetus for the more searching inquiry that an increasingly vocal minority had advanced in reviewing regulatory measures
on equal protection grounds. Perhaps the traditionally unassailable
44. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
45. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Andrus, 483 F. Supp. 425 (W.D.
Va. 1980).
46. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
47. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264, 281.
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bulwark of the commerce clause and the "progressive" character of
the legislation in question served to deter any intrusive judicial role.
If National League of Cities and a series of earlier cases had raised
the possibility, remote though it might be, of negating untoward legislative forays by way of the commerce clause, efforts to establish
federal strip-mining regulation did not fall within the questionable
zone.
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger, both of whom concurred in the judgment, were the only members of the Court who
raised significant questions concerning the extent of congressional
power under the commerce clause. Justice Rehnquist, in particular,
noted pointedly that there are limitations upon the authority of Congress to regulate under the clause. Both he and the Chief Justice
stressed the need to demonstrate that the affected local activities had
a substantial or cumulative impact upon interstate commerce before
the national regulatory power came into play.48 It was largely concern for maintaining an appropriate federal-state balance that
prompted Justice Rehnquist to depart from his extremely deferential
posture when, as in the past several cases, challenges had been leveled under an equal protection banner. Whether the substance of the
act itself had any persuasive effects in provoking these critical comments is a question that finds no grounding in the opinions and must,
therefore, remain conjectural.
Similarly, the Court responded in traditional fashion when
equal protection challenges were pressed with greater fervor in a
companion case. Hodel v. Indiana49 emphasized the so-called "prime
farmlands" provisions of the strip-mining regulatory statute. Mine
operators were required to demonstrate that the croplands exploited
would be restored to the prevailing productivity levels of the surrounding area once surface mining had been completed. Additional
safeguards were included and, viewed in its entirety, the law established a comprehensive protective and restorative program. Because
of the sweeping nature of the plan and expectations of adverse economic effects, the State of Indiana and several coal mine operators
challenged the scheme on a variety of grounds including the commerce power, fifth amendment due process and equal protection, the
tenth amendment and the just compensation clause of the fifth
amendment. A federal district court sustained these constitutional
48.
49.

Id. at 305, 310-11.
452 U.S. 314 (1981).
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objections and issued a permanent injunction. 50 The Supreme Court
noted probable jurisdiction and reviewed on direct appeal.
Apart from the commerce clause, tenth amendment and "taking" claims, which had been addressed within a different context in
the Virginia case, the equal protection issues assumed a position of
major significance in the Court's disposition of the Indiana controversy. Justice Marshall responded at length to the district court's
findings. He denied that, because of the absence of a variance procedure available to steep-slope and mountaintop operators in Virginia
and in like topographical regions, impermissible discrimination existed against the states of the Midwest in which prime farmlands
predominated as mining sites. Relying on a time-honored presumption of rationality attaching to social and economic legislation, Justice Marshall rejected such allegations in the absence of a clear
showing of arbitrariness. The lack of uniform geographic impact did
not suffice, he noted pointedly, to produce a proscribed result.5 1 Justice Marshall admonished the court below for acting as a superlegis5
lature and substituting its policy judgment for that of Congress. 1
The presence of a commerce clause predicate, still one of the
principal mainstays of the federal police power, apparently served to
prevent any broad inquiries into congressional motives and means. A
majority was not ready to move beyond the narrow tenth amendment
strictures set out in National League of Cities53 and, therefore, no
more than an oblique assault upon the commerce power could be
sustained. Unless considerations of federalism were forcefully. advanced and state prerogatives were directly and emphatically imperiled, deferential review would remain the prevailing standard. 5 '
Thus, a collateral attack by way of due process or equal protection
would not succeed or even figure prominently. In sum, when the
commerce clause assumes centrality in the constitutional configuration, voting arrangements conform to accustomed norms with no dis55
cernible attention to the "marginally more demanding scrutiny" of
which Justice Powell had written in his dissenting opinion in
50. Indiana v. Andrus, 501 F. Supp. 452 (S.D. Ind. 1980).
SI. Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 332-33.
52. Id. at 333.
53. But see infra notes 96-107 and accompanying text.
54. Cf. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982). In United
Transportation Union, a state once again invoked National League of Cities in alleging that a
state-owned railroad's labor-management relations were governed by state law rather than by
the Federal Railway Labor Act. Chief Justice Burger, writing for a unanimous Court, insisted
that the operation of railroads was not an area of traditional state concern.
55. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 245.
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Schweiker.
A confluence of equal protection and due process themes, revealing notable similarities in the interests that merit protection,
emerged in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co." In a prior ruling that
displayed not only a lack of sensitivity for the claims of the physically handicapped but also the absence of a proper regard for a flexible standard of timeliness in judicial review, the Supreme Court of
Illinois had refused to permit the state's fair employment practices
commission to overcome the effects of bureaucratic error. The commission's oversight in scheduling a hearing five days after the expiration of the statutory deadline was held to extinguish an employee's
cause of action in redressing alleged discrimination against him. Despite the complainant's contention that his fourteenth amendment
rights had been violated and that permission to file a second charge
was in order, the state court adopted an unyielding position. A failure to comply with the mandatory schedule, the Justices asserted,
meant that jurisdiction had to be denied; to do otherwise would alter
the design of the statute and unduly burden the public interest in
57
expediting a prompt resolution of disputes.
The Supreme Court's response on appeal reflected the unanimity of the Justices in condemning the harsh procedures and the results that the state court had sanctioned. Yet the choice of a mode of
intervention divided the Court. Justice Blackmun's majority opinion
went to the familiar property component of contemporary due process. A right of access to the courts, as well as a correlative right to
use the adjudicatory procedures of an administrative agency, was
said to be a state-created entitlement protected by the Constitution.58 More puzzling is a separate opinion by Justice Blackmun,
joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and O'Connor, premised upon
an equal protection claim. Though Justice Blackmun had served by
assignment as the writer of the controlling opinion, he apparently
felt that the alternative predicate for decision was sufficiently compelling to warrant independent treatment. The claimant's equal protection argument, he noted, was an unconventional one that had
been argued and briefed.59
How was it possible to charge an equal protection violation
when the underlying statute contained no explicit classifications that
56. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
57. Zimmerman Brush Co. v. Fair Employment Practices Comm'n., 82 III. 2d 99, 411
N.E.2d 277 (1980).
58. Logan, 455 U.S. at 428-33.
59. Id. at 438.
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distinguished between claimants? Had not the differentiation, if any,
occurred by a mere act of administrative inadvertence? Justice
Blackmun stated pointedly that it was the gloss placed upon the law
by the state's supreme court, not the legislature's framing of the
statute, that had created disparate treatment and which, in effect,
had established two categories of claims. Because the commission, so
portrayed, could "operate to terminate meritorious claims without
any hearing at all, while allowing frivolous complaints to proceed
through the entire administrative and judicial review process," 0 the
state system reflected arbitrary action and the statute itself was contrary to the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny. Thus, as Justice
Blackmun viewed it, the melding of the act with the terms of its
application and construction by the courts brought it within the
boundaries of impermissible state action. 1
A concurring opinion by Justice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, gave additional support to equal protection as the rationale of
choice in resolving the issues presented in Logan. If anything, Justice
Powell looked askance at an expansive due process which, as he saw
it, characterized the prevailing opinion. Instead, he expressed a preference for an equal protection standard comparable to that applied
in recent cases. The challenged classification, unusual though it
might be, had not conformed to a minimal rationality standard; it
represented arbitrary and irrational state action within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment. Apparently, Justice Powell's sole objection to Justice Blackmun's separate equal protection exposition
was its doctrinal breadth.6 2 Otherwise, a majority of six clearly
would have embraced equal protection, not due process, as the essential basis for the majority's holding of unconstitutionality. Due process once again appeared to be of questionable significance in the
adjudication of economic and social regulatory schemes.
A novel equal protection issue was presented in G.D. Searle &
Co. v. Cohn," in which the Court attempted to establish the extent
of time limitations for an action instituted against an out-of-state
corporation. The case arose from a suit by a New Jersey couple
against an Illinois-based pharmaceutical firm, the manufacturer of
an oral contraceptive which, the couple charged, had caused the wife
to suffer a stroke. For whatever reasons, the action was filed eleven
60.
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years after the event under New Jersey's long-arm rule that permitted extraterritorial service to the full extent permitted by the federal
constitution. The corporation's initial response was to remove the
case to federal court and to invoke the state's two-year statute of
limitations. To this defense, the couple replied by citing a tolling
provision that removed the prescribed restriction.
Since Searle had no officer in the state for service of process, it
was treated as an unrepresented foreign corporation under the prevailing law. Consequently, in that capacity the company was denied
the benefits of the state's statute of limitations, which is designed in
most instances to prevent a timeworn claim from being pursued. By
contrast, registered and local corporations functioned under no such
disability, the differential being tied ostensibly to the ease of locating
the companies and of making them amenable to the state's legal
processes. A tolling statute, applicable to nonrepresented foreign corporations, served to eliminate time-related barriers." ' In effect, then,
the Cohns, in bringing this action against Searle, availed themselves
of mechanisms for relief that ranged well beyond those that would
have been applicable had the suit involved either a domestic or a
represented company.
Was such a differentiation, premised upon corporate status,
warranted and, if so, was it sustainable within the accepted framework of equal protection analysis? A majority, speaking through Justice Blackmun, noted that a rational basis test sufficed to support the
distinctions drawn. There was no reason to move to a heightened
level of scrutiny, Justice Blackmun asserted, since the constitutional
challenges did not implicate any suspect or kindred classifications.
As such, the distinctions survived minimal review by reason of the
anticipated difficulty of reaching non-represented foreign corporations, always a potentially elusive and perilous legal venture despite
the existence of long-arm jurisdiction. The state's refusal to extend
the shelter of the statute of limitations, Justice Blackmun made
clear, met a constitutional standard that required no more than that
the law be "rationally related to the achievement of legitimate governmental ends."" Moreover, the Court concluded, the foreign corporation could always fall back upon the defense of laches to bar the
claim if delay was inexcusable and prejudicial."
64. Conflicting opinions concerning the status of the tolling provision were reflected in
Cohn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 447 F. Supp. 903 (D. N.J. 1978) and, on consolidated appeals, in
Hopkins v. Kelsey-Hayes, Inc., 628 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1980).
65. G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 408 (1982).
66. Id. at 411.
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The separate opinions in Searle differ more in emphasis than in
categorical doctrinal terms. Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice
Burger, concurred without reservation in the equal protection segments of the majority's reasoning. Their disagreement lay in the
Court's failure to resolve commerce clause questions that Justice
Blackmun had found clouded by ambiguity and inadequately considered in the courts below. 7 Returning to the equal protection issue,
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion did not take exception to the
choice of a rational basis standard or the need for disparate treatment. Instead, his objection related to the special burden imposed
upon foreign corporations and to the notably harsh results to which
it might lead. To reduce the onus of responsibility upon unregistered
companies, Justice Stevens proposed a lesser remedy, that being an
extended period for plaintiffs to initiate suits but not the elimination
of all time restraints. 8
In retrospect, if, as Justices Blackmun and Stevens observed,
the questions presented in Searle were novel, perhaps they were so
because equal protection was an inappropriate choice as the basis of
decision. An examination of the due process minimal contacts issues
of the past was all but abandoned as the state's jurisdiction was
freely conceded and affirmed. But it may be that, as Justice Powell
urged, the commerce clause questions were the pivotal ones, although full-scale consideration was postponed for another day. Did
not the registration requirement, a condition to be met before a foreign corporation might benefit from the statute of limitations, place
an undue burden on interstate commerce? By submitting to registration, the company, while engaged solely in interstate commerce, had
to assume all of the liabilities of a domestic corporation. Viewed in
this light, was not the tolling provision an unconstitutional tool of
coercion, violative of the commerce clause? Did not the state virtually compel compliance, the corporation's alternative being to risk
continued exposure to suit?
Should a commerce clause predicate ultimately prevail, it would
take Searle out of the mainstream of opinions descriptive of the doctrine of deference. Whenever adverse effects upon commerce can be
demonstrated, review is of a different order from that applied in an
equal protection context. The state's regulatory power, weighed
against the national interest in preserving an unfettered flow of interstate commerce, has always been assigned a subordinate position. A
67.
68.

Id. at 413-14.
Id. at 420.

THE BURGER COURT

far more compelling justification is called for in sustaining the state's
role. Thus Searle may not figure as a deferential review case at all
if, as seems likely, it reveals itself as a commerce clause case masquerading under the banner of equal protection.
When out-of-state wholesalers charged state-sponsored discrimination against their products, the Court reasserted the centrality of
commerce clause interests with considerable vigor. At issue in
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias69 was the validity of Hawaii's tax ex-

emption for specified indigenous beverages. The state disclaimed any
competitive threat to other liquors despite the legislature's previously
avowed purpose to encourage and to promote a new industry. Justice
White, writing for the Court, found discrimination in favor of local
7
products contrary to a "central tenet" of the commerce clause. 1
Since the exemption was intended to assist domestic enterprise and
unavoidably some competition existed between the favored products
and non-exempt liquors from outside the state, the exemption had a
discriminatory effect - one linked to economic protectionism and
Balkanization - violative of traditional commerce clause principles.
The state's invocation of the twenty-first amendment did not save the
challenged tax, a majority noted, since its provisions were not sufficiently implicated by the exemptions. Hawaii's tax scheme was not
intended to promote temperance or to facilitate the imposition of restrictions on trafficking in alcoholic beverages. Instead, it erected
barriers to competition and sought to circumvent commerce clause
safeguards unrelated to the twenty-first amendment's design. 7
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justices Rehnquist and
O'Connor, took issue with the Court's truncated approach to the
twenty-first amendment.72 Since the tax applied to local sales of liquor, Stevens argued, it fell within the amendment's reference to
"delivery or use therein.""3 The state's protection of its internal market need not be confined to ordinary commerce clause proscriptions
concerning the regulation of interstate trade. The dissenters were not
willing to accept inquiries into issues of economic protectionism, the
level of deference to be extended or the "central purpose" of the
twenty-first amendment. The force of its language was said to suffice
in sanctioning what the state had undertaken to accomplish.74
69.
71.

468 U.S. 263 (1984).
Id. at 276.
Id. at 275-76.
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If the Court succeeded in avoiding equal protection arguments
and in according primacy to the commerce clause in Bacchus Imports, a reversal of course occurred the following year in Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward.75 A return to a heightened rational
basis test as the predicate of choice led a majority to relegate com-

merce clause considerations to a subsidiary status. Without explicitly
denigrating congressional control over commerce, the Court elected
to emphasize the equal protection component well-nigh exclusively in
a context notably analogous to that in Bacchus Imports. An inquiry
into judicial motivations is always a hazardous if not a futile venture, but it is difficult to dismiss in a cavalier manner the majority's
purposeful, articulated commitment to equal protection. Dissenting
opinions may reflect a writer's penchant for hyperbole and self-indulgence, a sense of abandon because of a failure to maintain fragile
coalitions, or strongly held views concerning not only a distasteful
outcome but also an abrupt and arguably unwarranted turn in the
decision-making process. It may have been the latter that prompted
Justice O'Connor, who wrote for the four dissenters in Metropolitan
Life, to characterize the prevailing opinion as "astonishing," an "unfortunate adventure" and one that charts an "ominous course."176
What occasioned so harsh a response to an opinion by Justice
Powell, a doctrinal moderate and an able craftsman? Metropolitan
Life, in many respects, presented familiar charges of state discrimination against out-of-state insurance companies. Alabama's domestic
preference tax clearly favored in-state companies while a collateral
scheme permitted outsiders to reduce the tax differential by capital
investments in stipulated state assets and government securities. A
resort to the commerce clause might have sufficed to strike down the
offensive levy as discriminatory but for the McCarran- Ferguson
Act,7 7 which exempted the insurance industry from commerce clause
restraints. Plainly an alternate route had to be pursued if the state
law was to be set aside. To this end, Powell moved to equal protection as the basis for holding that the statute served no legitimate
state purpose and hence could not be sustained. Yet the cost exacted

was substantial. The rational basis test had to be applied with unaccustomed rigor if the Court was to deal with "parochial" discrimination. Even worse, the Court was compelled to distinguish commerce
clause and equal protection analysis, implying that the former, and
75.
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105 S. Ct. 1676 (1985).
Id. at 1684, 1694.
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perhaps Congress itself, could not limit the applicability of the latter.
It was this differentiation, as well as the level of equal protection review, that gave.rise to Justice O'Connor's spirited dissent.
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist, she took the
majority to task for departing from the deference due a tax classification when measured against minimal equal protection standards.
The notion that a state purpose might be acceptable under the commerce clause but suspect within an equal protection context struck
her as merely "another pretext" to evade established precedents. 8
Justice O'Connor raised the specter of a reversion, however minute,
to the "heyday of economic due process" and the discredited doctrines of Lochner v. New York 9 The assignment of Congress' commerce power to a subordinate status, if pursued, would create an
"economic straightjacket on the federal system." 80 She urged abandonment of this "ominous" course and a return to familiar guidelines
that had long served the nation."
That the rational basis test no longer may be looked upon as an
instrument for the affirmation of an almost boundless presumption of
validity has become increasingly apparent. Several months following
the Court's decision in Metropolitan Life, an equal protection challenge was raised by banks excluded from a regional banking arrangement authorized by the laws of several states. Once again there
was no question of a dormant commerce clause premise since Congress had acted positively in relation to banking. Yet a unanimous
Court, speaking through Justice Rehnquist, who was among the dissenters in Metropolitan Life, concluded that the regional scheme
met a traditional rational basis test and did not intrude upon compact and commerce clause interests. The prevailing opinion in
Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 82 focused on the local nature of banking institutions
and the state's interest in protecting them from incursions by mammoth financial corporations seeking to extend their effective reach.
Justice O'Connor, concurring, found little to distinguish Northeast
Bancorp from Metropolitan Life except the outcome. She expressed
satisfaction with the Court's return to longstanding equal protection
doctrine. It was not clear, she averred, why the "Equal Protection
clause should tolerate a regional 'home team' when it condemns a
78.
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state 'home team.' "83
The Court's reluctance to extend a strict or heightened scrutiny
test beyond existing precedents led to a searching reexamination of
equal protection standards. At issue in City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Center" was the validity of a municipal ordinance requiring a
special use permit for the operation of a group home for the mentally retarded. When the city denied the permit, the owners filed
suit, charging that the zoning ordinance violated their equal protection rights and those of potential residents. A federal district court
sustained the constitutionality of the ordinance, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that mental retardation
was a quasi-suspect classification calling for intermediate-level,
heightened review. 85 That an additional group had been added to one
of the "exceptional" categories invited a reassessment of the Supreme Court's haphazard pronouncements of the past several
decades.
The prescriptive categories created - ranging from a minimal
rational basis test through intermediate review to strict scrutiny were neither well defined nor capable of being translated into exacting measures of constitutionality. Justice White, who wrote for the
Court in Cleburne, noted that any level of review above rational basis would give rise to substantive judgments concerning legislative
acts.6 6 Perhaps it was this distasteful recognition of judicial intrusiveness, coupled with the ever-present need to preserve decisional
options, that fostered the application of rationality criteria when they
were neither appropriate nor effective. There are elements of incongruity in the Court's invalidation of the controversial ordinance, its
finding of "irrational prejudice" 87 against the mentally retarded and
the confounding assertion that no "more exacting standard"8 8 is required. As Justice Rehnquist had complained almost a decade earlier
when intermediate review was introduced, the phrases were so "diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or
prejudices relating to particular types of legislation . . .-.
The majority's enigmatic formulations elicited a trenchant dissent from Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and Black83.
84.
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mun. Not only did Justice Marshall condemn the Court's penchant
for a wide-ranging description of heightened scrutiny as "superfluous,"'9 but he also went on to label the method adopted as "'second
order' rational basis review" 9 1 - clearly not the test invoked in regulatory cases when an expansive doctrine of deference still prevailed.
He expressed misgivings that such review might endanger economic
classifications by encouraging a "small and regrettable step back toward the days of Lochner v. New York. ' '9 2 In closing, Justice Marshall protested the Court's "as-applied" approach to the ordinance in
question and lamented the lack of guidance as to when the "freewheeling and potentially dangerous"9 3 new standard was to be
employed.
The notion of an unremitting deference is no longer feasible.
The rational basis test has been transformed into a far less reliable
validating tool than any previously envisioned. It remains problematical whether the Court's almost desperate effort to avoid the creation
of additional categories of heightened scrutiny has been worth the
resulting equivocation concerning the nature of minimal review. Outcomes are not predictable even if, as seems likely, the probability of
the Court's reversion to a "superlegislative" status in the examination of economic legislation continues to be remote. The grey areas
in question relate to the status and treatment of disadvantaged social
groups seeking to protect their rights and interests. That a double
standard prevails is evident in Justice O'Connor's sweeping opinion
in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff," in which "old style" deference was vigorously reaffirmed by a unanimous Court. "When the
legislature's purpose is legitimate and its means are not irrational,"
Justice O'Connor asserted, "our cases make clear that empirical debates over the wisdom of takings - no less than debates over the
wisdom of other kinds of socioeconomic legislation - are not to be
carried out in the federal courts. '9 5 Such broad generalizations are
difficult to reconcile with the Court's current ruminations.
During the past several years, divergencies among the levels of
review have grown increasingly pronounced and notably difficult to
accommodate. The rational basis test has become more rigorous generally, but it has shown signs of reverting to a traditionally more
90.
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permissive state when the initiating force underlying the federal police power is explicitly tied to the commerce clause. What is more,
considerations of federalism have not been persuasive in diminishing
the deference due Congress. The vigor previously ascribed to the
tenth amendment has proved to be fleeting in nature and, if current
trends serve, it may well return to the moribund state to which it
had been relegated in the late 1930s. A majority apparently has had
second thoughts about effecting a marked diminution of national
regulatory authority, even if the areas selected are modestly and
carefully defined.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in the 1983 case of
EEOC v. Wyoming," came close to overruling National League of
Cities. With a transfer of Justice Blackmun's vote, the dissenting
minority in the 1976 decision became the majority in the Wyoming
case. The principal issue centered about the applicability of the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act to a state employee who
had been required to retire at the age of fifty-five when the national
standard for involuntary separation was seventy. A federal district
court dismissed the Government's suit in support of the employee's
claim, citing National League of Cities as the controlling precedent.
Objections to enforcement against the states of minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, Judge
Brimmer declared, were comparable to those that might be raised
with respect to the age discrimination act.9
The Supreme Court majority made much of the lesser degree of
federal intrusion in the Wyoming case. Though the age act admittedly regulated the states as states and dealt with matters customarily left to the states, Justice Brennan asserted, its effect upon traditional state functions was not direct or patently intrusive. The
principle of immunity derived from National League of Cities was
functional; its ultimate purpose was "not to create a sacred province
of state autonomy." 98 Consequently, Justice Brennan found that the
age act did not impair the state's ability to "structure integral operations" in areas of traditional state concern and so met the elemental
precepts of the 1976 decision.9 9 Chief Justice Burger, in a dissenting
opinion, remarked upon the majority's reading of the Constitution
that permitted congressional usurpation of a "fundamental state
96.
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function." 1o0
The Court went on to explicitly overrule National League of
Cities in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 1 '
sustaining the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act's wage
and hour provisions to employees of a municipally owned transit system. Speaking for the same majority that prevailed in the Wyoming
case, Justice Blackmun moved to a major restatement of guidelines
describing the nature of contemporary federalism and of the Court's
role in the American constitutional system. Blackmun found unworkable previous efforts to distinguish traditional from nontraditional
state functions in establishing the boundaries of regulatory immu-

nity.' 02 When the affirmative powers of Congress under the commerce clause are being assessed, he asserted, the Court has "no license to employ freestanding conceptions of state sovereignty.' 103
Restraints on the exercise of national authority and cognate mechanisms for the protection of states in the federal system were said to
be largely procedural, the products of internal safeguards rooted in
the political process.' 04
Responding to the majority's implicit suggestions of a virtually
unlimited commerce power and of an almost non-existent tenth
amendment, Justice Powell took exception to the abrupt departure
from recent precedents and, more significantly, to what he viewed as
a grossly distorted notion of federalism. Powell, in a spirited dissent,
referred to an "emasculation" of state powers and "federal overreaching" by way of an expansive reading of the commerce clause.0
He denied claims that the political process served as the principal
means of preserving state interests. The role of states in the federal
system, he insisted, was not a matter of official grace but of constitutional structure dating from the founding of the Republic. Justice
Powell further criticized the majority for its apparent rejection of the
judiciary's review function in protecting the essential bases of American federalism. 106
100. Id. at 251. Justice Stevens, in a sharply worded concurring opinion, called for "a
prompt rejection of National League of Cities' modern embodiment of the spirit of the Articles of Confederation." Id. at 250. His comments concerning the centrality of the commerce
power in giving rise to the Constitution itself prompted a gratuitous rejoinder from Justice
Powell, joined in dissent by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 265-66. For a similar division, see the
several opinions in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
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If the dissenting opinions of Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor
were less persuasive than Justice Powell's carefully reasoned discourse, they were no less critical of the majority's performance. Justice O'Connor, in particular, objected to the Court's demeaning
characterization of state sovereignty. She went on to point out that
the "judicially crafted" expansion of the commerce power, reflecting
acknowledgement of an integrated national economy, had been designedly offset by limitations imposed on federal regulatory authority. 107 Both Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor predicted that the new
majority's holding would be short-lived and that the principles of
National League of Cities would soon be revived.
In retrospect, the elusive quest for doctrinal symmetry -

set-

ting aside the only case that had negated congressional power under
the commerce clause for close to half a century - accomplished little. The National League of Cities criteria, by their very ambiguity,

had furnished the materials out of which inventive judges might
have fashioned viable predicates. A majority need not have sought to
reassume a mien of self-abnegation. Instead, the Court could have
reaffirmed its historic role of monitoring the federal system while
avoiding the extension of an unrestrained discretion to Congress.
Justice Blackmun's references to safeguards derived from the political process failed to provide an adequate substitute for carefully developed judicial indicia. In the final analysis, the issue narrowed to a
choice between congressional federalism as a standard or a resort to
less intrusive measures associated with constitutional federalism.
III. Conclusion
If the revival of meaningful review at the national level has
been sporadic and, at times, lacking in continuity, the effort itself
holds promise, particularly with respect to state legislation. The
Court is no longer tied to a pattern of deference so extreme or so
rigid as to raise serious doubts concerning the efficacy of the review
function. A progression of cases, though hardly conclusive in their
cumulative effects, may signal the opening of a new era or, perhaps
more accurately, a return to an updated version of pre-Darwinist
moderation. There is little evidence of the blatant and palpable incursions of the pre-1937 years when judicial supremacy and
"superlegislative" status were bywords for a pervasive negativism
that threatened to impede the course of social progress. All the
107.
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same, the Court has made it clear that regulatory legislation as such
does not lie beyond the scope of judicial scrutiny. Emphatically absent is a cloistered or privileged zone that, for whatever historical or
psychological reasons, the Roosevelt Court and its successors had
wholly immunized from any form of intervention.
For several decades, the notion persisted that the Court had
taken as its special responsibility the protection and expansion of individual liberties in a leviathanic state. Chief Justice Stone's famous
footnote in the Carolene Products case lent credence to the idea that
specified rights were "preferred" and, therefore, worthy of an unusually high level of judicial protection to ensure the survival and proper
functioning of the democratic process.108 It was this impetus that
served to encourage the development of suspect classifications and
fundamental rights that, in effect, required a reversal of the usual
presumption of validity. Notably omitted from the Court's solicitude
were economic rights that somehow were treated as of lesser concern. The fiction persisted that parallel lines of development could be
maintained, that crossings and clashes between the two categories
would never occur, and that the preservation of economic rights was
best left to representative bodies.
That equal protection has been selected as the basis of intervention may be the result of historical factors as well as of contemporary practices. The ignominy that attached to due process as a tool
of judicial negativism could not readily be set aside. So it was that
the clause, and particularly its liberty provision, served more appropriately as the catalytic agent for the piecemeal nationalization of
the Bill of Rights and, more recently, for the establishment, by judicial fiat, of a new bill of rights with personal autonomy as its capstone. Equal protection, by contrast, revealed a nondescript past, less
compelling precedents, and prospects for generating standards of
judgment that were said to provide flexibility and discretion in the
sensitive economic regulatory area. Apart from the protection of
human rights, then, the vitality of equal protection as the basis of
judicial activism will be determined by the nature of the glosses
placed upon the rational basis test as a "minimum" deterrent to legislative excesses or capricious ventures. 109 Whether equal protection
rationality offers a range of options comparable to those previously
108. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
109. For an intriguing if speculative variant of routine applications, see City of Mesquite
v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283 (1982). The rationality test in Mesquite was reconsidered within a context noteworthy for the Justices' spirited reexamination of independent state
grounds.
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available but repeatedly misued when linked to due process analysis
remains an open question.

